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Abstract
Single-sign-on authentication (SSO) for licensed library e-resources is growing in popularity, touted as a valuable
tool supporting the personalization of user experiences while maintaining user privacy. Such proposals, however, are based on assumptions that are not well supported by evidence. This paper addresses three such flawed
assumptions: that SSO assures privacy; that all authorized patrons have SSO credentials; and that personalization is
desirable to libraries and their patrons. In reality, privacy is merely one possible SSO configuration, not a guarantee;
walk-in library patrons do not have SSO credentials; and there is a growing body of evidence that existing personalization algorithms, and the data collection practices that feed them, cause great harm to users and to society.
In this paper, I present Cornell University Library’s experiences and concerns surrounding these particular issues,
which lead us to oppose SSO authentication for our licensed e-resources unless certain conditions are met.

Context

Assumption #1: SSO Is Anonymous1

This paper reflects a portion of the Charleston 2018
presentation “Authentication, Identity Management,
Privacy and Personalization: How Can Libraries Strike
the Right Balance and Avoid the Growing Dystopian
Dangers?” The panel, which addressed various issues
associated with this broader topic, consisted of Kari
Paulson, Molly Rainard, Steven Harris, Heather Shipman, and Josh Howlett. In my portion, I addressed
the “dystopian dangers” posed by single-sign-on
(SSO) authentication, in which a library patron signs
into an external online service by logging in to their
library’s institutional account; the institution then
sends data about the patron to the service provider to verify that the patron is entitled to use the
service.

It’s true that SSO can be configured to preserve
user anonymity. It is not, however, the only possible
configuration, nor is it the default. At many institutions, the SSO configuration is not under the direct
control of the library, limiting our ability to protect
our patrons’ data.

We used the word “dystopia” in our title, description,
and during our presentation; Kari observed that its
purpose is to draw attention to the severity of the
problem. However, the word itself comes from philosophy and fiction; it implies a situation so extreme
that it’s difficult to believe that it could become reality. Because the dangers inherent in exposure and
collection of user data are a reality, I’ve chosen to
turn the burdens of disbelief and proof around: SSO
has been proposed as a utopian solution to a variety
of problems, but the evidence shows that it has, thus
far, failed to prove that it works as promised.
Contemporary culture frequently describes a dystopia as a utopia gone wrong: assumptions on which
the utopia were built contained fatal flaws. In this
panel and paper, I outline the three most egregious
flawed assumptions inherent in SSO proposals.
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Such is the case at Cornell University Library (CUL):
Cornell University’s central IT department (CIT)
uses Shibboleth as its SSO implementation for the
entire campus and is responsible for its configuration. Because the library world’s discussion of SSO
assumed and promoted the benefits of its anonymity, CUL didn’t closely examine CIT’s configuration.
We discovered our mistake mid-2016, when I downloaded a detailed non-COUNTER usage report from
the ProQuest Ebook Central (PQEC) platform and
discovered that title-and session-level information
was associated with usernames, and the usernames
were our personally identifiable university netIDs.
There are two major problems that led to this
scenario.
First: PQEC shouldn’t have been collecting usage
data at this level.
Our discussion of this issue with ProQuest branched
out into further discussion of libraries’ concerns and
practices regarding patron privacy, and ProQuest has
taken our strongly worded opinions under advisement. ProQuest’s data collection practices have
since changed with the introduction of the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
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We continue to work with ProQuest on these issues;
this panel—organized by ProQuest’s Kari Paulson—
is a part of that work. The dangers of widespread
patron data dissemination and collection cannot be
addressed by merely creating a mutual understanding between CUL and ProQuest. No one can solve
this alone.
Second: Cornell’s SSO configuration exposed
personally identifiable information.
Cornell is a member of the InCommon federation,
a centralized service facilitating the transfer of SSO
data between participating identity providers and
service providers. Cornell’s membership in InCommon predates the library’s use of SSO authentication;
the identity data that Cornell sends to InCommon is
the data any member service provider would receive
by default. CIT has configured it such that personally
identifiable information (PII) (such as name, netID,
and e-mail address) are provided to InCommon.
This is great for research collaboratives who use
InCommon to facilitate communication between
collaborators across the world, but it’s disastrous for
the preservation of library patron privacy. CUL has
a good working relationship with CIT—a luxury not
enjoyed between every library and their IT department, unfortunately—and so, moving forward, we’re
working with them to address this issue:
•

We judge IP authentication to be far less
problematic than SSO, and are avoiding SSO
implementations.

•

We have cancelled a subscription whose
platform replaced IP authentication with an
SSO authentication more invasive than we
were willing to accept.

•

When a newly added, much needed e-resource requires SSO, we’re working with CIT
to write an overriding SSO configuration for
that e-resource to release as little patron
data as possible.

•

We’re launching a broader CUL investigation
into privacy issues at large, with intent to
craft a more comprehensive privacy policy,
as well as tools and workflows to support it.

Ideally, we want the default SSO authentication
configuration to submit the smallest amount of data
possible, but because the current configuration
has been in use for a very long time and is used by
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a large number of service providers, retroactive
cleanup will be extensive and must be conducted
carefully to avoid breaking many authentication processes simultaneously. Additionally, the responsibility
for this project would lie entirely within CIT, not CUL,
and thus initiating it will require building significant
political will at the highest levels of both CUL and CIT.
It is our hope to foster this as part of our work on the
broader privacy initiative.

Assumption #2: All Authorized Patrons
Have a Login
For SSO to function, a library patron must enter their
institutional username and password. However,
not all authorized patrons have such a login—nor
should they need one. Walk-in patrons should not be
expected to create an account in order to use library
e-resources onsite; this is an especially critical issue
for public libraries that serve entire communities. In
many cases, library funding may include a requirement to provide such access.
Cornell University is a hybrid public/private university; although some of our colleges are endowed,
others are state-funded and associated with the
State University of New York (SUNY) system. SUNY
policy states that “the public is given access to University libraries insofar as possible.”2 CUL requests
walk-in access for licensed e-resources in all license
negotiations, largely successfully.
Theoretically, SSO services like Shibboleth can support walk-in access, but this is far more complicated
to implement than on-campus IP authentication is.
Furthermore, CUL is not aware of any example of
successful SSO implementation with viable walk-in
access. We have, however, seen discussion of problematic implementations via the ERIL-L mailing list.

Assumption #3: Libraries and Their Patrons
Want Personalization
“Personalization” comes at the price of data collection, and libraries are widely believed to be one
of the last institutions still protecting user privacy;3
active defense of patron privacy is part of the library
mission, even including defense against our own
governments.4
Regarding data collection practices, Cornell has more
questions than answers, and at the forefront of them
all, we ask: what happens to the data? There is an
extreme lack of transparency on this front.

Sometimes this is because an organization doesn’t
have the infrastructure in place to communicate this
information effectively. CUL’s initial efforts to investigate our SSO data leaks were hampered merely by
no one—CUL or external—knowing who the right
person to ask was, and staff turnover compounds
that problem. Continuing investigations are also
often hampered by the lack of a common vocabulary between programmers, privacy advocates,
product managers, and other stakeholders. We have
made inroads on this problem, but it is far from
solved, and remains a major issue across the library
e-resource industry.
But sometimes the lack of transparency is deliberate.
It should go without saying that this is unacceptable.
Furthermore, the precedents for personalization
proposals are appalling: companies like Google,
Facebook, and Amazon are making money hand
over fist by using Big Data and AI to “personalize” their platforms, but there is a growing body
of evidence that these algorithms are doing very
bad things.
In her book Algorithms of Oppression, Safiya Noble
argues that search engine algorithms reinforce
and amplify existing racist and sexist prejudices,
while simultaneously presenting an air of neutrality
because a computer chose the results.
In the keynote sessions of the 2018 ER&L conference,5 Robyn Caplan, danah boyd, and Siva Vaidhyanathan discuss ways in which Big Data, social media,
and other algorithms are impacting our entire culture—not, generally, in good ways. Vaidhyanathan, in
particular, focuses on ways in which they’re actively
undermining democracy.
Facebook has run unethical research studies on its
users;6 Amazon built (and later scrapped) a recruiting
tool that showed bias against women;7 Target was
able to identify a pregnant teen and, through their
targeted advertising, disclosed this to her family;8
data breaches are rampant.9
Humans have been working on personalization algorithms for years, and these are the results. This is our
proof of concept; this is the precedent some service
providers are eager to follow.
Cornell University Library seeks to avoid sacrificing patron privacy to personalization proposals.10
We desire proof that the data is being handled in

responsible and ethical ways, and so far, we have
seen no such proof.

What Would Make SSO Palatable?
Under what circumstances would CUL reconsider
our opinion of SSO authentication? First, all of the
aforementioned problems would need to be solved.
We desire the following:
•

Patron anonymity should be the default,
and it should be difficult to expose PII by
accident.

•

Walk-in patrons should be able to use library
e-resources without being asked for a login.

•

Service providers should be transparent
with regard to which fields of data are being
collected, what they’re being used for, and
how long they’re stored.

•

Contact information for those responsible
for these practices should be easy to find
and use.

•

Service providers should be willing to work
with libraries toward mutually acceptable
data collection and retention practices.

Once the above issues are solved, we would be more
willing to consider limited personalization protocols,
under the following conditions:
•

Patrons should still be able to use the service without revealing PII.

•

Personalization should only be enabled by
the patron’s request.

•

Patrons should be able to choose the
level of personalization they desire and be
properly informed as to what data would
be collected to enable each personalization
function.

•

Data use should be ethical.

Under no circumstances should the library e-resources industry emulate Google, Facebook, and
other companies collecting and mining user data to
benefit their revenue streams, to the detriment of
the user’s privacy. In fact, given the importance of
privacy to the library brand, we believe that library
e-resource vendors actively protecting patron privacy
could have a significant advantage in the marketplace over competitors undermining or ignoring
privacy issues.
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